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Abstract
Fixed income has received far less attention than equity portfolio optimisation since Markowitz’
original work of 1952, partly as a result of the need to model rates and credit risk. We argue that
the shape of the efficient frontier is mainly controlled by linear constraints, with the standard
deviation relatively unimportant, and propose a two-factor model for its time evolution.
Despite the passage of some 65 years since the emergence of Markowitz’s portfolio theory [12],
almost all of the discussion on portfolio optimisation has been confined to equity portfolios. Fixed
income is more difficult because there are two main drivers—rates and credit—and unlike equities
both have term structures associated with them and are driven by a concept of yield or spread,
which influence the construction of expected return. Credit has the additional feature that the
upside is typically far smaller than the downside and so we cannot construct risk on the premise of
Normal distributions. Another differentiator is the use of credit ratings, which in turn are connected
to regulatory capital: this too has no counterpart in equities. Our interest lies both in top-down
fixed income portfolio selection from a set of broad asset classes, which we refer to as sleeves (for
example, US BB rated corporates), and also bottom-up security selection. Here we mainly consider
the first of these problems, but what we say applies equally to both.
The main thrust of recent literature [9, 20, 3] has been to use yield curve models as a way of
understanding risk and return (rather than trying to deal with bond prices directly). We agree
with this. (In a recent paper [4] the authors do not use yield curve models, as “this reduces
misspecification risk”[p.8], but that is a specious argument, as price volatility determines yield
volatility and vice versa.) Remarkably, though, two fundamental issues are entirely absent except
in [4]: duration constraints, and credit risks. We will consider these in depth, but also have another
concern: we do not agree that mean-variance is the best framework for understanding fixed income.
This is not just because stdev1 does not capture tail risks—if this were the objection we would
simply recommend CVaR2 as a risk measure—but because fixed income portfolios are subject to
many different sources of risk, and it is likely to be more effective to explicitly constrain all of these
rather than aggregate them into a single quantity. Put differently, simply knowing the stdev of
an instrument or sleeve, and its ‘beta’ to an index, is much less helpful than understanding how
it behaves in a variety of interest rate and credit scenarios, and optimisation must address this
directly.
∗Department of Mathematics, Imperial College London, Exhibition Road, London SW7 2AZ, UK. Email:
richard.martin1@imperial.ac.uk
1Standard deviation.
2Conditional Value at Risk, also known as Expected Shortfall. See for example [10] in its application to equity
portfolio optimisation.
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Indeed, our central thesis is that fixed income portfolio optimisation is mainly about linear
programming (LP), and the construction of risk measures through the maximum of losses in differ-
ent prescribed rates and credit scenarios, allowing moderate and extreme losses to be constrained.
Notice that we only need define these scenarios—it is not necessary to estimate their probabili-
ties—whereas to calculate the stdev, CVaR or whatever, their probabilities will need to be known.
Another benefit is simplicity as we do not need to estimate or deal with the covariance matrix of
the assets: we simply need the expected value or loss of each asset in each scenario. Further, for
a long-only fixed income portfolio, we scarcely need to constrain stdev, because if the interest rate
and credit duration are tightly constrained, the stdev will necessarily be low.
Another matter of interest is the shape of the efficient frontier and how it has evolved over time.
Many discussions about fixed income asset allocation go no further than drawing a chart of return
vs risk, marking the various asset classes upon it; this is unhelpful to the portfolio manager who
must have no more than (say) 15% in emerging markets, 10% in European periphery, an average
credit quality no worse than BB+, a maximum duration of 6, etc. Such constraints reduce the set
of permissible portfolios and hence the maximum return for a given level of risk: therefore they
alter the efficient frontier just as much as do market conditions. For a given set of sleeves and
constraints, we use a simple new model to directly parametrise the efficient frontier, and show that
two easily-interpretable factors capture almost all its variation.
The paucity of research of fixed income portfolio optimisation requires us to spend some time
laying the foundations, which we do in the next sections. After that we introduce our model for
the efficient frontier and go on to present ‘live’ results.
1 Interest rate risk and return
Tehe natural framework for expressing views on duration and curve risks is that of Heath–Jarrow–
Morton [5], which expresses the motion of the discount-factor curve Bt(T ) through the instanta-
neous forward rate ft(T ) = −(∂/∂T )Bt(T ), and in particular through its volatility σ. We refer the
reader to [7, §17.7] for a full discussion of what is summarised below. The quantity ft(T ) evolves
as
dft(T ) = µ(t, T,Ωt) dt+
∑
i
σi(t, T,Ωt) dWi,t
in which Wi,t are Brownian motions that are not necessarily independent: E[dWi,t dWj,t] = ρij dt;
the symbol Ωt denotes all previous history of interest rates that are necessary for determining the
forward rate volatility at time t. We comment on µ later.
In general, the HJM framework does not give rise to Markovian dynamics for the short rate,
and while this is not essential it is useful for interpretability and analytical tractability in certain
problems. However, a special case does3, which is:
σi(t, T ) = σie
−κi(T−t).
By performing principal component analysis (diagonalising ρ) we decompose the motion of ft(T )
into a set of probabilistically independent components σ♯i(T−t)W ♯i,t, in which each σ♯i is a finite sum
of exponential functions. This gives the familiar picture of the first, most important, factor giving
a roughly parallel shift, the second causing steepening/flattening, and so on. Specific interest rate
scenarios ωi can then be obtained by assigning realisations to each W
♯, so that ω1 is a shift higher,
ω2 a shift lower, ω3 a steepening, ω4 a flattening, and so on. For strongly nonlinear products such
3The form can be more general than this but for reasons of space we omit the details.
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as those with embedded options (e.g. callable bonds) we will also need different sizes of rate curve
move: for example the sensitivity to a 2% move will not be twice the sensitivity to a 1% move4.
The simplest form of this model is when we have only one factor, and for long-only portfolios
this will do most of what is needed. By solving for the forward rate and noting that ft(t) = rt, and
then differentiating, the short rate dynamics emerge as
drt =
(
θ(t)− κrt
)
dt+ σr dWt, (1)
which we recognise as the Hull–White model [6]; the function θ is obtainable from today’s term
structure. If we make the simplification κT ≪ 1 then we bump all forward rates by the same amount
(parallel bump). Apart from analytical tractability there are two advantages to Hull–White. The
first is that having σr is constant, rather than depending on r through a function of the form σ
√
r
or σr, as seen in the Cox–Ingersoll–Ross and Black–Derman–Toy models respectively, causes no
difficulty when rates go negative. The second is that it aligns fairly well with historical experience,
as can be seen from the following observation: in the last thirty years the (absolute) volatility of
bond yields has not depended strongly on the level of rates. Figure 1 shows this for the typical
ten-day move in the 10y Treasury yield. Further, Table 1 shows that a Gaussian assumption with
a constant yield volatility σy = 0.90% is remarkably good, though there is the usual caveat that it
should not be relied upon for estimating very high levels of confidence, particularly over short time
scales.
Some simplifications are possible. Rather than using the sensitivity to the instantaneous forward
curve (or the zero curve: a parallel shift in one is the same as a parallel shift in the other), simply
bump all the bond yields and use the yield-price relationship, which for a bullet bond of maturity
T and coupon c paid m times a year is, as a fraction of par,
P (T, c; y) = (1 + y/m)−mT + c
1− (1 + y/m)−mT
y
. (2)
This can be made even simpler if the yield bump is small, by using the duration and convexity.
While bumping the yield is not the same as bumping the forward rate (because the yield is not
a linear function of it), it has the advantage that it is not necessary to build the instantaneous
forward curve or the zero curve. This treatment is very common in practice.
For the purposes of this discussion we are most interested in the first interest rate factor and
are concerned with the effect of a moderate to large increase in rates, on a 1y horizon. If we regard
this as commensurate with a move of a little over two stdevs, and the annual volatility of the USD
curve is ∼ 0.9%, then this is a 2% rate increase.
The HJM framework establishes the forward rate drift µ that makes the expected discounted
value of a zero-coupon bond a martingale under the risk-neutral measure P0. Under a subjective
measure P1 the drift can be different and can be modelled by regressing the Brownian motions
Wi,t on an assumed set of technical and econometric factors. Common ideas include: short-term
momentum, long-term mean reversion, and aversion in risky asset classes (flight to quality). More
simply a common assumption, which we use in the simulation later, is carry-and-rolldown, which
is that ft(T ) stays fixed
5: this makes higher-maturity bonds attractive in a steep yield curve
environment.
4Similarly for portfolios with derivatives. Seasoned campaigners will remember how much Orange County suffered
in 1994 as a result of nonlinear products, after the Fed hiked rates 2% in short order.
5Another way of expressing this it to make ft(T ) a P1-martingale and ignore any convexity that the traded
instruments may have.
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|∆x| (∆x)2 (∆x)4 95% 99%
Actual 0.137 0.0303 0.00360 [−0.322,+0.347] [−0.442,+0.465]
σy = 0.9% 0.141 0.0345 0.00289 [−0.345,+0.345] [−0.453,+0.453]
Table 1: Statistics of 10-day changes (∆x) in the 10y Treasury yield, cf. Normal distribution. · · · denotes
(time) average.
|∆x/x| (∆x/x)2 (∆x/x)4 95% 99%
Actual 0.0667 0.00891 0.000784 [−0.142,+0.231] [−0.237,+0.352]
σˆ = 40% 0.0626 0.00620 0.000120 [−0.142,+0.166] [−0.183,+0.223]
Table 2: Statistics of 10-day relative changes (∆x/x) in the CDX.IG 5y spread, cf. lognormal distribution.
· · · denotes (time) average.
2 Credit risk and return
2.1 Risk
Credit risk depends on the fortunes of all the issuers involved in the portfolio, which is potentially
a very high-dimensional problem. A full treatment is not possible in a paper of this size, but we
can make some salient observations, and demarcate some problems that are easier than others:
(A) A portfolio that is long-only and with no significant issuer concentrations;
(B) A market-neutral portfolio;
(C) A derivatives trading book with possibly large issuer concentrations and long and short po-
sitions across the curves of some or all of the issuers.
It is obvious that (A) is the easiest to deal with, and the only one that can be tackled reasonably
well using ‘credit duration’. To this end we should bear in mind that credit spreads typically move
proportionally to the spread level, suggesting
dst = (. . .) dt+ σˆst dZt (3)
with Zt a process of unit quadratic variation (E[dZ
2
t ] = dt). In the simplest setup, Zt is a Brownian
motion and we have a lognormal model.
For indices, or more generally well-diversified credit pools, a lognormal assumption captures
the majority of market moves but does not capture large systemic shocks and is therefore incorrect
at high levels of confidence: see Table 2 and Figure 2 which use σˆ = 40%. Note that credit index
options are typically priced with essentially this model [16], and a volatility that is often around
35%. From this comes the well-known idea that we should assess credit spread by bumping spreads
proportionally rather than apply a 1bp increase to each credit spread (the so-called CS01), as the
higher-yielding ones will typically move more. This gives rise to duration × spread as a simple
measure of risk, and so a large, but not extreme, credit spread increase (by which we understand a
little more than 2 stdev), is roughly a doubling of the credit spread: this is a convenient definition
which we call CSx2. For extreme moves (credit sress loss, CSL) we propose not relative changes
but instead spread levels and define the stress loss of an instrument or asset class to be the effect
of moving the yield from its current value y0 to a stress level y∗. Using (2) this is
CSL = 1− P (T, y0; y∗) = (1− y0/y∗)
(
1− (1 + y∗/m)−mT
)
(4)
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and y∗ is obtained by adding a specified spread level z∗ (Table 3, which is commensurate with the
losses sustained in 2008-09) to the riskfree yield of the relevant maturity6. This kind of constraint
operates differently from CSx2 because it is countercyclical, in the sense that as spreads widen,
CSx2 rises but CSL falls, as losses have already been sustained. Constraining both these measures
has the attractive consequence of buying risk when spreads are wide (when CSx2 is the binding
constraint), increasing the position as markets rally (as CSx2 falls), but reducing it when they
become too tight (as now CSL binds instead).
Of the three cases demarcated earlier, (A) is the one that concerns us most here, but it would be
remiss not to consider (B) and (C), in which the main difficulty is caused by single names or sectors.
It is instructive to consider the following problem, set in CDS rather than cash terminology for
convenience. Suppose I sell $50M of 2y protection and buy $20M of 5y protection on an investment-
grade issuer. As the duration ratio is a little under 5:2, this trade is CS01 positive, which naturally
gives the impression of being slightly short risk. The impression is made even stronger if we bump
spreads proportionally: as the 5y spread is almost certainly higher than the 2y spread, the trade is
predicted to perform well if spreads rise as the 5y spread should move more. But this is only true
for small moves. If the issuer becomes distressed, the 2y spread will start to rapidly increase so
that the curve inverts, and it is obvious that in the event of default there will be a large loss. The
relation between the two spreads is complex and a bivariate lognormal distribution does not give
the full picture. The right way to think about this problem is to forget about spreads and yields and
return to basics, in the form of the structural (Merton) model, to which an introduction is provided
in [13, 14]. As a function of the firm value, for small moves the trade has a slightly negative delta
and positive gamma7, whereas for large reductions in firm value the delta becomes positive and the
gamma very negative: see Figure 3. This motivates the idea that to assess idiosyncratic risk we
should reduce the firm value of each issuer by a small amount (say 10%) and also a much larger
amount (say > 50%) and constrain the risks involved. An alternative, which bears strong similarity,
is to use rating transition models, which we describe presently, because the credit rating is a proxy
for firm value or distance-to-default. As the rating curves for higher-yielding or distressed credits
are flat or inverted, the effect shown in Figure 3 is captured. For ‘granular’ portfolios this may be
unnecessary if the issuer concentration is tightly constrained.
2.2 Expected return
We cannot simply use credit spread as a proxy for expected return, because it is not guaranteed.
For a portfolio of individual credits, we in principle require an expected spread change, and default
probability, on each name. This is not practicable because each bond has to be updated as the
market moves. On the other hand, it is practical to attach a credit rating to each issuer8, as this
only needs to be changed when important news comes out, or there is a change in view on the
credit. For these purposes the credit rating does not have to correspond to the public rating: it
encompasses our view of the credit quality. With this in mind, there are two key components in
the modelling. The first component is a set of credit curves (of spread vs maturity) for each rating,
for the sector in question. This can be done using an appropriate numerical fitting procedure such
as that discussed in [18]. The second component is a Markov chain model of transition rates for
all ratings from AAA, AA+, . . . , down to default, see e.g. [8, 21].
If the bond is of maturity T and we are looking at the ER at time horizon t < T then we reprice
the cashflows of a T − t maturity bond in each rating state j (say) and weight the results by the
6Or LIBOR for floating-rate instruments.
7Using option parlance, because we explicitly treat credit as a deep out-of-the money option on the firm.
8Also taking subordination into account where necessary.
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transition probability from the current rating i to j. Symbolically if pi→j(t) denotes the transition
probability over time t and Pj(T, c) denotes the price of a bond of rating j, maturity T and coupon
c, then the expected value of the bond at time t is
D∑
j=1
pi→j(t)Pj(T − t, c)
(D denotes the state of default). The total return is obtained by discounting this back to today,
adding in the coupon accrued over time [0, t], and subtracting the current price P0. By judicious
algebra9 this gives
TR =
ct+B0(t)Pi(T − t, c)− Pi(T, c)
+B0(t)
∑D
j=1 pi→j(t)
(
Pj(T − t, c)− Pi(T − t, c)
)
+ Pi(T, c) − P0

 , (5)
understood as follows. The first row of terms is the carry and rolldown of a bond rated i, assuming
the rating and associated spread curve remain fixed. The second adjusts for rating migration and
default, and is negative. The third is the cheapness of the bond relative to the curve for rating
i, so that it is assumed that convergence will occur towards that rating curve over time t, as the
bond need not currently price in accordance with its rating. In the interests of simplicity, some
approximations have been made: the accrued ct will only be received if the issuer does not default
in the period [0, t], so the first term needs to be slightly reduced10; the credit spread of the bond
may not converge to its assumed rating curve by time t; we may have the view that the curves
themselves will move, independently of any rating transition by the credit(s). These issues can be
corrected, at the expense of a little extra complexity.
If we ignore the third term then (5) reduces to carry and rolldown minus a hurdle representing
the expected loss from rating downgrade and default (and also upgrade but this is not enough to
counterbalance the other two). For high yield credits this hurdle is significant. As an example,
assume that a B rated credit has a 1y default probability of ca. 4–5%. If the bond is trading at
par and recovery is assumed to be 30%, then a spread of at least 300bp will be needed to justify
buying the bond. If the riskfree rate is 2% then this translates to a yield of around 5%. Taking into
account transitions to B−/CCC+/CCC, we conclude that unless the bond yield exceeds ca. 5.75%,
it generates no ER. Not taking credit losses into account causes the portfolio to become barbelled,
as the ER of high-yield assets is greatly overestimated: the optimiser buys these in some proportion
and allocates the remainder to cash so as to satisfy whatever average rating constraint is given.
2.3 Structured credit
A full discussion of structured credit modelling is not possible but one issue is paramount. A
CDO/CLO tranche rated AA pays a much higher spread than a AA rated corporate (the latter trade
flat to LIBOR). Anecdotally, the investment world still has trouble explaining this phenomenon,
and a commonly-proffered explanations are illiquidity and opacity. While there is some truth in
these, they do not address a basic fact: at the senior end of the capital structure, CLOs concentrate
market risk, and according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model11 which is the risk for which an
9Essentially, shuffling terms and noting that
∑D
j=1
pi→j(t) = 1 for any i, t.
10If the hazard rate is λ then it should be (1− e−λt)λ−1c < ct.
11The CAPM in its usual form is not ideally suited to credit, but it is possible to reformulate it using CVaR rather
than stdev as a risk measure, and on so doing the conclusion is essentially the same. Except in distressed debt it is
hard to find truly idiosyncratic risks in the credit market.
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investor is compensated. A portfolio of AA rated companies is likely to be well diversified, whereas
a portfolio of AA CLO tranches is just a systematic bet—all the more so in Europe where different
European CLOs are written on substantially the same pools. The former portfolio is less risky than
the latter, so the market cannot price them equally. Such tranches also have a nonlinear response
to index widening and so their stress losses (as eq. (4)) are higher than AA corporates. Failure to
incorporate this causes gross overallocation to structured credit.
3 Optimisation
3.1 General principles
We define the excess expected return (ER) as the expected return less the riskfree rate, and risk
as the value of a risk function which will be defined presently. Most problems reduce to:
Maximise ER s.t.
{
Risk ≤ limit
Other constraints.
(6)
A misconception is that we should attempt to maximise the Sharpe ratio. The table below, with
three hypothetical portfolios, shows why this is wrong (ER and risk are annualised, and in context
risk means stdev):
ER Risk SR
1 1% 0.5% 2
2 5% 4% 1.25
3 20% 25% 0.8
In context, Portfolio 1 offers the highest SR but too little ER to be attractive; to make it more
so it would need to be levered, which may be expensive or even impossible. Portfolio 3 offers
the highest ER, exhibiting the sort of risk that might reasonably come from a distressed debt
portfolio—but in that case one want a much higher ER. Portfolio 2 offers similar characteristics
to a credit portfolio of borderline IG/HY credit quality in a steep yield curve environment, where
rolldown and a benign view of credit performance might offer such characteristics. This sort of
risk-return characteristic might be observed ex post, in a year in which markets ‘went up and up’,
but as an ex ante statement about expected return and volatility it looks too optimistic, especially
in the current market environment. It may be fairly said that Portfolio 2 is the most attractive
(partly because it is virtually impossible to obtain), despite having neither the highest ER nor the
highest SR.
In the context of interest rate risk alone, the following are standard problems which have been
considered as mean-variance optimisations (e.g. in [20, 3]) but are easier to formulate using LP.
First, an outright optimisation:
Maximise
∑n
j=1 cjuj s.t.
{ ∑n
j=1 uj∆Xj(ωi) ≥ −εi
0 ≤ uj ≤ uj
where cj is the ER of the jth instrument (we have to take a view on rates, because under P0 the
ER is always zero), ∆Xj(ωi) is the return of the jth bond in the ith scenario, −εi is the worst
acceptable loss in the ith scenario, uj are the weights to be determined, and uj is the jth allocation
limit. (Transaction costs can easily be incorporated.) Secondly, index tracking, where risk pertains
to the difference between the index and the tracker. For this we can decide whether or not to take
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a view on rates. If we do then the problem is a variant of the first:
Maximise
∑n
j=1 cjuj s.t.
{ ∑n
j=1 uj∆Xj(ωi)−∆Y (ωi) ≥ −εi
0 ≤ uj ≤ uj
where ∆Y is the return of the index in the ith scenario. If we do not then we no longer need to
know about ER and can minimise the tracking error in the worst scenario:
Maximise min
i


n∑
j=1
uj∆Xj(ωi)−∆Y (ωi) + εi

 s.t. 0 ≤ uj ≤ uj
This minimax problem can be rewritten by introducing a ‘slack variable’ u0 to obtain:
Minimise u0 w.r.t.(uj)
n
j=1 s.t.
{
u0 +
∑n
j=1 uj∆Xj(ωi)−∆Y (ωi) + εi ≥ 0 ∀i
0 ≤ uj ≤ uj
which is again a standard LP problem. If, on solution, u0 > 0 then it means that it is impossible to
make the tracking error as small as is desired. This same method has successfully been applied to
static hedging problems in credit [17]. Notice that throughout we have constrained the weights (uj)
to be nonnegative, as in each case we are trying to replicate a long-only index. Puhle [20] failed to
do this, on the grounds that in the context of a mean-variance problem it leads to solutions that
cannot be written in closed form—an entirely spurious objection, as LP problems are so quick to
solve—and then ended up with impractical portfolios consisting of delicately balancing long and
short positions, a consequence that should have been obvious at the outset12.
Typical constraints encountered in fixed income can be grouped into these categories:
• Allocation limits, which for bottom-up models will be primarily sector, country and issuer
limits, and for top-down models, sleeve limits;
• Rating constraints e.g. simply the proportion of sub-IG assets, but also an average rating on
a linear scale13, or Moody’s weighted average rating factor (WARF) which is nonlinear and
penalises high-yield credits much more14;
• Regulatory capital, e.g. NAIC in the US and Solvency Capital Ratio (SCR), which takes
duration into account, in the EU;
• Scenario-based risk measures such as IR01, CS01, CSx2, CSL;
• Nonlinear risk measures such as stdev, CVaR.
We discuss this in detail next.
12Aside from this is his disproportionate emphasis on (hypothetical) portfolios of zero-coupon bonds, which repre-
sent a tiny proportion of the bond universe—in the context of corporate and sovereign bonds, we estimate < 0.1%—
which is another reason why his conclusions are of little practical value.
13AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA−=4, . . .
14AA=20, A=120, BBB=360, BB=1350, B=2720, CCC=6500.
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3.2 Allocation limits and regularisation
The purpose of allocation limits is threefold. First, it may be undesirable for reasons of liquidity
to buy too much of a certain asset (e.g. more than 5% of a corporate bond issue). Secondly, any
asset or sleeve may suffer an unexpected idiosyncratic accident, which such limits mitigate. As
an example, suppose we are concerned that Turkish assets might drop 10% (in price terms), and
we do not want to lose more than 0.5%×NAV in this eventuality: we constrain Turkey ≤ 5%.
Thirdly, there is the difficulty of ill-conditioning. Unconstrained problems have solutions that are
very sensitive to model inputs. In the context of LP, the optimal point will jump from one corner
solution to another as the expected returns are varied, and mean-variance problems suffer from
similar problems associated with ill-conditioning of the covariance matrix15.
3.3 Regulatory capital
In past years the matter of RAROC (ER ÷ regulatory capital) has been the subject of more
attention than is necessary. We explain why it is the wrong thing to optimise. Obviously when
a particular asset is awarded zero risk weight, optimising RAROC generates nonsense, but even
if this pitfall is avoided, it also causes allocation to be skewed towards high-yielding assets whose
regulatory capital treatment is (too?) lenient, and it also causes overconcentration. It is also
commonly thought that because an asset has a RAROC less than the desired hurdle, it should
not be bought. This is also wrong: it is only necessary for the portfolio as a whole to the have
high enough RAROC, with the lower-yielding assets providing diversification. The correct way to
understand regulatory capital is simply as an extra constraint. Unfavourable regulatory capital
treatment is a valid reason not to invest in an asset or asset class; favourable regulatory capital
treatment is not a good reason to invest in it. Ultimately, economic risk is the risk that is being
taken, and so it cannot be ignored.
3.4 Risk measures
The last twenty years has seen much attention devoted to an axiomatic theory of risk measures,
one of the earliest papers being [1]. However, the volume of research is out of all proportion
to its practical significance. It is almost impossible to find a financial disaster attributable to a
‘poor choice of risk measure’; invariably, the culprit is an incorrect assessment of the probabilities
of bad market moves, which is fundamental to any calculation. The most egregious example in
recent times has been the ‘London Whale’ incident, in which, three years after the Global Financial
Crisis, Normal distribution assumptions were still being used to assess the VaR of structured credit
products16.
In fact, the necessary axioms for portfolio optimisation can be expressed succinctly: (i) posi-
tivity; (ii) 1-homogeneity17; (iii) subadditivity, i.e. if X1,X2 are portfolios then for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
R
(
λX1 + (1− λ)X2
) ≤ λR(X1) + (1− λ)R(X2).
With these assumed, we can conclude immediately that in the presence of convex constraints, the
efficient frontier must be concave18. The brevity of this discussion might seem disturbing, but it is
15Which are traditionally obviated by Tykhonov regularisation, i.e. imposing a small penalty ∝ ‖u‖2, which is like
adding an idiosyncratic risk to each asset.
16See [11, p.286]: correspondence of P. Hagan on 07-Feb-12.
17If we scale our positions by some factor, the risk is scaled by the same factor.
18If two portfolios X1, X2 lie on the efficient frontier, then any admixture λX1 + (1− λ)X2 is feasible (obeys the
constraints); its ER is the weighted sum of the ER’s of X1, X2; and its risk is ≤ the weighted sum of their risks.
Therefore the efficient frontier lies to the left of the chord joining X1 and X2.
9
justified19.
As is well known, stdev and CVaR obey (i)–(iii), but VaR does not obey (iii). The expected loss
in a given scenario (e.g. CSx2) obeys (ii),(iii). Finally, so too does the maximum of risk measures
obeying (ii),(iii), allowing us to combine several different risk measures Rk into a ‘total’ one R by
R =
∨
k
αkRk, αk > 0
where
∨
denotes ‘maximum’ and (αk) are positive constants. As in context at least one of the Rk
will be positive, R also obeys (i). Notice that constraining R(X) to be less than or equal to some
specified value R is identical to constraining Rk(X) ≤ α−1k R for each k.
3.5 Iterated linear programming
If all the constraints are linear then we have a LP problem, for which standard methods are
established and fast [19], even for large-scale problems. Nonlinear optimisation problems, provided
they are convex, can be solved iteratively using cutting-plane methods [2], which owe much to
Newton-Raphson. A convex function R necessarily lies above its tangent at any point, so
R(u) ≥ R(u∗) + (u− u∗) · ∇R(u∗) (7)
where ∇R is the gradient of R, and u∗ denotes the allocations at the present stage in the optimi-
sation. So, if the upper limit on R is R, it is necessary for
u · ∇R(u∗) ≤ R−R(u∗) + u∗ · ∇R(u∗), (8)
a linear constraint which is added to the constraint set. The optimisation is rerun, ideally using
the current point u∗ as its starting-point. Then u∗ will move, and we add a new constraint of the
form (8) and keep rerunning until R(u∗) exceeds R by no more than an acceptably small amount
20.
Note that it is important to add a new constraint each time, rather than moving (8) around each
time u∗ changes. The only requirement is that R be convex and that we can easily evaluate
21 ∇R.
4 Modelling and Results
4.1 Efficient frontier model
The efficient frontier demarcates the maximum level of ER (r) for each level of risk (R). It is an
upward-sloping, concave function and, assuming that a portfolio with 100% cash is feasible, it must
pass through the origin22. Given that risk and return have different units23 the functional form
ψ(r/a,R/b) = 0 is necessary, so it is then a question of picking a sensible function ψ. With this in
mind, and considering the required shape, an obvious idea is
r = at(1− e−R/bt), at, bt > 0; (9)
19For example we shall not be detained by the fact that standard deviation does not satisfy the so-called mono-
tonicity axiom, see e.g. [1], which is often deemed necessary. If it is, then the logical conclusion is to dump all of
Markowitz’s portfolio theory.
20As it will typically not get below R in finitely many iterations. Alternatively, in (8) replace R by a tighter
constraint R − ε and stop when R(u∗) < R.
21In effect the so-called risk contribution, see e.g. [15, §3].
22One might enquire why, if all the constraints are linear, the efficient frontier is not simply a straight line. The
answer is that at different points on the frontier, different constraints are binding; therefore, the frontier is piecewise
linear.
23If we change the time horizons on which risk or return are calculated, the axes will be stretched accordingly.
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we write t because over time the parameters are expected to change. The interpretation of at, bt is
that at is the ER for a high-risk portfolio, as it is the R→∞ asymptote, and at/bt is the ER per
unit risk for a low-risk portfolio, as it is the gradient of the efficient frontier at the origin.
In different market scenarios and with different constraints binding, at, bt will behave differently:
(a) The riskfree curve steepens, with the IR01 constraint binding. (Note that a parallel shift will
have no effect, if a static interest-rate volatility is assumed, because by ER we always mean
relative to the front end of the curve.) Here a fwill increase but not b, and the frontier is
simply stretched upwards.
(b) Credit spreads increase, CS01 constraint binding. This is the same as (a).
(c) Credit spreads increase, with the CSx2 constraint binding. Here the return and risk increase
by the same factor, and the efficient frontier is stretched upwards and to the right so that a
and b both increase.
(d) Credit spreads increase, CSL binding. Here the ER increases but risk decreases, so that a
moves up and b down.
(e) ‘Risk off’/‘Flight-to-quality’. If yields compress in low-risk portfolios but decompress in high-
risk ones, the main effect is that b increases more than a, so that a/b (the gradient of the
frontier at the origin) decreases.
In view of this we can expect that over time at, bt will not be perfectly correlated, so that we will
need both to explain the full evolution of the efficient frontier. Plausibly, they are mean-reverting
over a long enough time scale, and so a reasonable econometric model is that (ln at, ln bt) follows a
bivariate Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process.
4.2 Simulations
We construct a risk function defined as
R = R1 ∨R2 ∨R3 ∨ 2R4 (10)
where the risk measures are defined as:
R1 Loss from riskfree rate +2% (for floating-rate instruments this will be zero)
R2 Loss from credit spreads doubling (CSx2)
R3 Stress losses (CSL) as eq.(4)
R4 Annual stdev
and the stdev is constructed as follows. Interest and credit risks are assumed uncorrelated, so
thst the variances simply add. As discussed earlier, interest rate variance uses a yield volatility of
σy = 0.9% across all maturities, while the relative credit spread volatility is σˆc = 0.35%. The credit
risks of different sleeves are correlated with coefficient ρ = 0.8 throughout. The portfolio variance
Σ2 over a time horizon ∆t (taken as 1y) is therefore
Σ2 =
{(∑
j ujD
ir
j
)2
σ2y + ρ
(∑
j ujD
cr
j sj
)2
σˆ2c + (1− ρ)
∑
j u
2
j(D
cr
j )
2s2j σˆ
2
c
}
∆t (11)
where Dirj and D
cr
j are the interest rate and credit duration of the jth sleeve.
We then vary the total risk limit R and plot the ER that the optimisation finds, and also fitting
(9). This is done on different dates going back to 2000 in 3m steps.
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The asset classes are described in Table 3, which also shows the Bloomberg tickers for the yield24
and the allocation limits imposed on each sleeve. They are: US Treasuries of various maturities,
US investment grade and high yield corporate bonds ranging from AA to CCC; US and European
subordinated financials (the latter being swapped into USD); emerging market corporate/sovereign
IG/HY; residential mortgage-backed securities; CLOs from AAA to BBB. The allocation constraints
on the various sectors are: high-yield (of all types) ≤ 60%; emerging markets ≤ 15%; structured
credit ≤ 10%; financials ≤ 20%. The only other constraint is that the average credit rating be no
worse than BB.
Figure 4(a) shows the evolution of the efficient frontier since 2006, and clearly (9) is an excellent
fit in a variety of different market scenarios. Figure 4(b) shows the evolution of at and bt, which
are seen to be positively correlated. Independent factors a∗t , b
∗
t are obtained by taking a
∗
t = at as
the first and b∗t = bt/a
p
t , for suitably-chosen p, as the second. We found p ≈ 0.66 by regression
of ln bt against ln at, and this is shown in Figure 2(c). Their interpretation is that a
∗
t represents
overall risk appetite, so that as the market goes risk-on, a∗t declines; whereas b
∗
t indicates flight-
to-quality having controlled for at, so that as the market moves into safer portfolios b
∗
t increases.
Comparison between 2006 and 2018 is interesting because Figure 4(a) shows the efficient frontiers
to be of different shape, and indeed the factor b∗t is higher now than then.
We then run the test without the stdev constraint, so the 2R4 term in (10) is removed. The
results are not identical, but can scarcely be distinguished from Figure 4 and so we have not plotted
them. In view of what we have said before about long-only portfolios, the stdev constraint is largely
redundant once the interest rate and credit duration are constrained.
5 Conclusions
We have established a framework for doing fixed income portfolio optimisation. The efficient
frontier is mostly a product of linear constraints, and for long-only porfolios the standard deviation
constraint is largely unnecessary. By directly modelling the efficient frontier we can make statements
about risk and reward that pertain directly to the portfolio with full regard to the constraints. The
factors at, b
∗
t almost completely describe how the efficient frontier of a particular portfolio has
evolved over time, and give a manager an indication of how risk is being rewarded within the
operating constraints.
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Figure 1: The magnitude of short-term changes in US 10y Tsy yield has not typically depended on the spot
level. Bars are at symmetrical 95% confidence. Data range 1990–2017. Source: Bloomberg.
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Figure 2: Moves in credit spread (CDX.IG 5y shown here) are typically proportional to the spot level. Bars
are at symmetrical 95% confidence. Data range 2004–2017. Source: Bloomberg.
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Figure 3: Sketch of PL vs firm value for credit steepener trade discussed in §2. A naive argument based
on parallel spread curve movements gives information only about the behaviour in the encircled part of the
graph.
Name Ticker Max (%) Maturity z∗ (bp) Float
Cash 100
Tsy (5y, 10y, 30y) CMAT05Y etc. 100 5, 10, 30 -
US Corporate AA JULIAAY 10 10 100
US Corporate A JULIAY 15 10 200
US Corporate BBB JULIBBBY 20 10 350
US Corp. IG 5y IBOXUMAE 20 5 250 ∗
CLO AAA JCLOAAAY 5 10 350 ∗
CLO AA JCLOAAYL 5 10 550 ∗
CLO A JCLOAYLD 5 10 900 ∗
CLO BBB JCLOBBBY 5 10 1700 ∗
US Corporate BB JPDKBB 5 7 900
US Corporate B JPDKB 5 7 1500
US Corporate CCC JPDKCCC 5 7 3000
US HY 2–4y JPDK2/4 5 3 1500
EM Corporate IG JBDYIGYW 10 8 450
EM Corporate HY JBDYHYYW 5 7 1100
EM Sovereign IG JPBYIGYW 10 12 350
EM Sovereign HY JPBYHYYW 5 10 1200
Agency real estate LUMSYW 10 5 1200
US IG Financials JULIFINY 10 12 500
US HY Financials JPDKFINL 5 8 1000
EU Insurance (Tier 2) JPSUIBEY 10 10 700
Table 3: Universe used in simulation. ‘Float’ denotes LIBOR-based instruments with no interest rate risk.
Ticker refers to Bloomberg. IBOXUMAE is the ticker for the on-the-run CDX.IG 5y CDS index.
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Figure 4: Results for test portfolio. (a) Efficient frontiers (dotted lines) and model fit (solid lines) at
beginning of April on dates shown. Units are fractions of portfolio NAV, on both axes. (b) Time evolution
of the factors at, bt and second independent factor b
∗
t
= bt/a
0.66
t
.
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